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Is Europe a Risk Averse Actor?
ZAKI LAÏDI* 
Abstract. This article makes the hypothesis that the European Union (EU) is a political 
actor whose identity and strategy on the international fi eld are based on a strong aversion 
towards risk. In order to follow this hypothesis, we will defi ne the exact meaning of a Risk 
Averse Power (RAP). Roughly speaking, an RAP can be defi ned as an international actor 
that defi nes and responds to the political stakes of a given identifi ed risk in terms of a will 
to reduce its uncertainties and uncontrollable effects. Then, in the absence of any existing 
composite index, we propose fi ve criteria for measuring this risk aversion: job loss risk, 
biotechnology risks, climate change risk, fi nancial risks, and risk of war. In the next sec-
tion, we attempt to explain why Europe is risk averse, through various factors: Europe’s 
non-state construction, the existence of a deliberative European political space, Europe’s 
social model aiming towards market risk minimization, and, fi nally, the end of the need 
for an Empire. Finally, we determine the broader implications of risk aversion for Europe 
as a global actor.
I Introduction
Risk has been largely treated by sociologists.1 However, international relations 
have been less concerned by the issue except when dealing with decision-making 
processes in foreign policy. The perspective offered here is very different. It aims 
at defi ning risk aversion as a political identity that is expressed at the global level 
by an actor like the European Union (EU). This is of course a hypothesis on which 
a lot of research needs to be conducted. However, at this stage, we would like to 
make some assumptions in answering the following questions: What do we really 
mean by a risk aversion? In which areas risk aversion is signifi cant for the EU? 
How will we measure it? What are the implications for the EU in a world in which 
traditional nation states are dominating the multipolar chessboard and seem ready 
to take risks. Those questions are not purely theoretical. The terrible performance 
of the EU at Copenhagen revealed its weakness in a world driven by power politics 
and in which risk aversion cannot dispense an international actor from having a 
political strategy.
* Professor at Sciences-Po (Centre d’études européennes).
1 Among them, U. Beck, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1997); 
M. Douglas & A. Widalsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); 
J. Franklin (ed.), The Politics of Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); B. Latour, Politiques 
de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie (Paris: La Découverte, 1999).
European Foreign Affairs Review 15: 411–426, 2010. 
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II What Risk Aversion Means?
A Risk Averse Actor (RAA) can be defi ned as an international actor that defi nes 
and responds to the political stakes of a given identifi ed risk in terms of a will 
to reduce its uncertainties and uncontrollable effects.2 Indeed, each international 
actor might be considered an RAA since faced with a decision, it assesses its costs 
and benefi ts before acting. Even North Korea weighs the costs and benefi ts of 
launching missile strikes on Japan. However, risk aversion is not a simple matter 
of rationality; it is also a matter of identity. This being said, we can say that an 
actor evinces strong risk aversion in the following cases:
The RAA tends, more than others, to steer clear of using force when faced with 
confl icts within the international system. The actor will reject the use of force out-
right and propose a cooperative alternative. Therefore, the actor generally accords 
greater import to civilian systemic risks than military risks. For example, in rank-
ing their eight major perceived risks, Europeans place armed confl ict and nuclear 
proliferation in the sixth and eighth spots, respectively, while global poverty and 
climate change rank fi rst and second.3
The RAA insists, more than others, on the indivisibility of systemic risks 
between actors. In doing so, the actor encourages joint, cooperative practices rather 
than emphasizing those tending towards confrontation and unilateralism. The actor 
is particularly interested in protecting ‘global public goods’ and limiting the hard-
ships of ‘global public bads’ through civilian and normative procedures.4
The RAA tends, more than others, to call for the actualization of global norms 
already legitimized by international institutions. Such an actualization would, in 
the view of the actor, reduce the most signifi cant global risks.
Does the RAA hypothesis differ from the more traditional Soft Power defi nition? 
Yes, because it is wider and more precise. Much wider, because a Risk Averse Power 
(RAP) deals not only with internal concerns (the aversion to Genetically Modifi ed 
Organism (GMOs), for example) but also with external ones (risk of armed con-
fl ict). An RAA considers dimensions that a Soft Power generally does not. Europe’s 
aversion to biotechnological risks, or to fi nancial instability, tells us much about the 
EU’s relation to risk. Such risk aversion allows us to make hypotheses and to draw 
conclusions about Europe’s behaviour on the international stage. In contrast, the 
Soft Power model takes into account only risks related to war and peace.
An RAA, then, can be characterized by its determination to reduce the ‘risky 
behaviours’ of state actors. In this perspective, it aims to integrate their actions 
within a normative framework tending at constraining their actions and making 
2 O. Borraz, Les politiques du risque (Paris: Sciences Po Les Presses, 2008).
3 Eurobarometer, ‘Europeans’ Attitudes towards Climate Change, Special Eurobarometer 313, 
Fieldwork January–February 2009’, <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_313_
en.pdf>, July 2009.
4 Z. Laïdi, Norms over Force, the Enigma of European Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008).
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them more predictable. It should be noted that an RAP can only truly exist in a 
democratic political system where public deliberation plays a crucial role in evalu-
ating risks. Naturally, the extent of public opinion involvement varies according to 
the subject at hand. Yet public opinion remains essential insofar as risk aversion 
illustrates marked social preferences. Aversion to the risk of war shows a strong 
preference for peaceful confl ict settlements; aversion to food safety risks is related 
to a strong preference for the precautionary principle, and so on.
Assuming the existence of three major systemic risks in the world system – 
environmental risks, market risks, and war-related risks (war, weapons of mass 
destruction) – we posit that the EU and/or the European Member States manifest, 
generally speaking, a stronger aversion towards these risks than the United States, 
China, and Russia. European risk aversion is manifested in the following ways:
Strong aversion towards environmental risks, demonstrated by a demand for 
more stringent and numerous international norms than those of other political 
actors.
Proposals for stricter market fi nance regulation than those of other nations 
(United States, emerging countries).
Marked reluctance as regards the use of military force (Europe never speaks of 
war or enemies) in spite of strong national differences on the issue.
III How Can Risk Aversion Be Measured?
There is no composite index that would allow us to compare risk aversion between 
different actors (Europe versus the United States, for example). However, there 
are a certain number of relevant indices that allow us to measure aversion to risk. 
For the EU, we can identify fi ve such indices: (A) biotechnology risks, (B) climate 
change risk, (C) fi nancial risks, and (D) risk of war.
1. Biotechnology Risks
Europeans do not manifest a specifi c or stronger aversion to risk vis-à-vis biotech-
nologies than other world regions might. For issues of gene therapy, nanotechnol-
ogy, and genetic pharmacology, potential risk aversion is signifi cantly discounted 
by the perceived social utility of the particular biotechnology. Risk aversion is 
also discounted by the moral acceptability of the  technology and by the confi dence 
that a European population might have in the capacities for regulating it.5 Euro-
pean optimism regarding biotechnology has markedly increased since 2002, after 
an obvious decrease during the 1990s. Even so, European risk aversion towards 
GMOs remains strong and persistent. In a 2007  Eurobarometer study, 58% of 
Europeans expressed a negative attitude towards GMO products. This fi gure has 
5 Eurobarometer, <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/quali/ql_science_en.pdf>, 2007.
–
–
–
been relatively stable throughout the years, whereas the general confi dence in 
biotechnologies has signifi cantly increased. Indeed, there are still national differ-
ences that prove considerable. However, none of these differences act according 
to any principle of predictability. From an overall standpoint, for example, the 
new Member States do not manifest more tolerance to GMOs than the other states. 
The strongest hostilities towards GMOs can be found among new Member States 
as different as Slovenia and Cyprus. By the same token, the least hostility is also 
discernible in new Member States such as Malta. The national differences in con-
ceptions of GMOs are therefore neither political nor historical. They are also not, 
for that matter, geographical. Risk aversion to GMOs is much stronger in Cyprus 
and in Greece than in Germany or Denmark. However, international comparative 
studies clearly indicate that Europeans, taken as a whole, are far from being the 
most hostile towards GMO products.
The proportion of people agreeing or disagreeing with the statement ‘The ben-
efi ts of biotechnology to create food crops that do not require chemical pesticides 
are greater than the risks’ are shown as follows:
Source: The Environics International Poll of 2000, International  Environmental Monitor 2000 
(Toronto, Canada, 2000).
For certain authors inclined towards comparative studies of Europe and the 
United States, it is not possible to conclude that Europeans are more risk averse 
than Americans, because areas exist in which the latter population is more risk 
averse than the former (air pollution). European risk aversion is stronger in 
all areas linked to food production.6 This being so, the aversion to GMOs has 
6 J.B. Wiener & M.D. Rogers, ‘Comparing Precaution in the United States and Europe’, Journal 
of Risk Research 5, no. 4 (2002): 317–349.
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 certain implications for international trade that are clearly absent in the case of 
air pollution. This explains the dissimilarity between European and US politi-
cal behaviour in the past several years each time risk regulation comes to the 
fore in international discussions. Europeans continue to lobby for recognition of 
the precautionary principle by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The United 
States, on the contrary, remains strongly hostile to the same principle. These par-
ticular divergences were articulated at the Convention on Biological Diversity 
as well as within WTO forums. They originate in each nation’s approach to risk 
evaluation. The United States relies on risk evaluation that can be scientifi cally 
measured (sound science), whereas Europeans insist on risks resulting from the 
uncertainty of scientifi c results. The United States tends to base its decisions on 
what is already known – or what can ultimately be known – where Europeans 
prefer to approach decision-making processes that favour precisely what is not 
known. Americans are interested in fi nal products; Europeans insist on consid-
ering production processes. As a result, the United States tends to consider that 
GMO-altered products are not substantially different from the original products, 
whereas Europeans consider such products to be fundamentally altered by GMO 
introduction.7 At the signing of the Cartagena Convention on Biosafety in 1998, 
the Europeans seem to have scored a point in winning recognition for the pre-
cautionary principle as an international principle.8 However, within the WTO, 
progress has been much slower. The United States deems the Sanitary and Phy-
tosanitary (SPS) legislation suffi cient to regulate risks, whereas Europeans want 
to go much further in ultimately securing formal recognition of the precautionary 
principle. There are no indications for European progress on this project. On the 
contrary, in fact, there are several reasons for this. First, the global trade agenda 
has become so weighty that it is now more and more diffi cult to add items to it. 
This is especially true given that the new WTO actors – emerging countries – are 
fi ercely opposed to all propositions that appear to want to limit trade. For the 
second reason, we must recognize that these questions should be approached on 
regulated, case-by-case bases. We cannot answer such questions on the basis of a 
constraining international agreement, but rather by jurisprudent means such as the 
WTO dispute settlement procedures.
Over time, the WTO has evolved, ultimately becoming exceedingly sensi-
tive to general shifts and developments. In the past, WTO jurisprudence tended 
towards a restrictive interpretation of Article XX GATT, which serves to defi ne 
exceptions to international trade regulation. More recently, the WTO has stepped 
beyond a purely clinical interpretation of Article XX; now it takes other param-
eters, like environmental defence, into consideration. For the fi rst time, a WTO 
7 M. Pollack & Greg Schaffer, When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics of 
Genetically Modifi ed Foods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
8 R. Falkner, ‘Regulating Biotech Trade: The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’, International 
Affairs/RIIA 76, no. 2 (2000): 299–313.
panel  recognized the right of a Member State to invoke climate change risk as its 
justifi cation for limiting particular imports into the country. The irony of history 
has it that the case in question was presented against the EU (Brazil v. the Euro-
pean Union). Indeed, the evolution of WTO jurisprudence has not been linear. 
Perhaps, though, it shows that international trade regulation can progress without 
the need for additional norms.
2. Climate Change Risk
Climate change risk aversion can be measured in at least three fashions:
By comparing the relative importance Europeans attribute to climate change 
risks as compared to other risks.
By examining the agreements, notably in terms of economic growth, that Euro-
peans are willing to make in order to combat climate change.
By examining the concrete actions Europeans have taken on the international 
stage in order to fi ght climate change, even in light of potential economic costs 
should no international agreement be reached.
Europeans’ particular evaluation of climate change risk becomes clear when 
one examines the measure of importance accorded to it. Such an evaluation is 
rendered clearer when climate change risk is compared with other possible risks. 
When Europeans were asked to identify the most serious among seven major risks, 
climate change appeared in second place.
Evidently, climate change risk aversion is perceived differently among the EU 
Member States. However, we can effectively point out that it is stronger in Scan-
dinavian countries than in new Member States or in southern Europe. There are, as 
–
–
–
(1) Poverty and lack of drinking water 69%
(2) Climate change risk 47%
(3) Economic crisis 39%
(4) International terrorism 35%
(5) Spread of infectious disease 32%
(6) Armed confl icts 29%
(7) Increasing world population 24%
(8) Proliferation of nuclear weapons 15%
European Opinion-Based Evaluation of Systemic Risks 
(in Descending Order)
Source: Eurobarometer, ‘Europeans’ Attitudes towards Climate 
Change, Special Eurobarometer 313 (January–February 2009)’.
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always, exceptions to this observation. Of all the European states, Slovenia is the 
most concerned by climate change issues. Unlike other southern European coun-
tries such as Portugal, Greece also demonstrates a signifi cant degree of concern. 
This kind of heterogeneity renders diffi cult the construction of a unifi ed Euro-
pean political position for international negotiations. Despite having presented a 
common political offer regarding greenhouse gas reductions, Europeans still have 
trouble deciding how to apportion reductions among Member States such that the 
common goal might be reached. There is also diffi culty reaching consensus on how 
to fi nance climate change combat in developing countries. Reluctance to reduce 
emissions, as well as reluctance to offer support for developing countries, comes 
largely from new Member States whose economies are more carbon-intensive than 
those of older states. As a result, new Member States do not deem the problem as 
suffi ciently serious. Often, these same states also lack the resources necessary to 
fi nance reductions.
There are no international comparative studies that would allow for a term-
by-term comparison of climate change risk evaluation in relation to other risks in 
other world regions. However, we can reference opinion-based studies indicating 
the kind of balances that particular societies are willing to accept between eco-
nomic growth and climate change.
In response to the affi rmation, ‘We should maximize economic growth even if it 
would hurt efforts to combat climate change’, the following fi gures result:
EU-12 21%
United States 40%
Source: German Marshall Fund of the United States 
(GMF), Transatlantic Trends, Topline Data (Chicago, 2009), 
<www.gmfus.org/trends/2009/docs/2009_English_Top.pdf>.
Clearly, Americans are twice as ready as Europeans to sacrifi ce climate change 
in favour of economic growth. This fi gure is a signifi cant indication of Europe’s 
and the US’s relationship to climate change. There is a third way of approach-
ing the question of climate change risk aversion as regards the European popu-
lation: we can compare the EU’s offi cial commitments to reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions with their economic costs. Logically, a country or group of coun-
tries for which a failed international agreement would lead to a dramatic drop in 
gross domestic product (GDP) would be most likely to propose ambitious goals 
as regards climate change. Inversely, a country or group of countries for which 
failure to reach an international agreement would not signifi cantly harm that 
country’s economy would be most likely to propose a more modest engagement. 
We can say of a country or a group of countries, then, that an actor manifests 
strong climate change risk aversion when its international commitments outweigh 
the economic costs (relative to other countries) that global warming potentially 
presents.
Climate Change: Economic Costs and Unilateral Commitments
Economic Impact on GDP1 Copenhagen Commitments
United States: -0.1% -4%*
China: -0.9% +79%**
Europe: -1% -20%***
India: -3% Uncommitted****
Africa: -4% Uncommitted
1 Impact in the context of a hypothetical respect for the 2/2.5 °C temperature target. The 
fi gures are average numbers and thus do not take into consideration the discrepancies 
between the strongest and weakest estimations. The discrepancies are especially marked 
for developing countries: because of the uncertainty in assessment, risk is always higher 
for these countries.
Notes:
* The United States offi cially committed to a 17% greenhouse gas reduction by 2020 
from 2005 levels. If we compare this fi gure with Europe's base year (1990), however, 
this 17% represents only a 4% reduction.
** China has not offi cially committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. Rather, it has 
committed to a strong reduction in energy intensity. According to certain Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates, such a reduction would 
lead to a 79% emissions increase between 2005 and 2020. This major increase would 
nevertheless ultimately decelerate the growth of greenhouse gas effects. At the same time, 
it is important to remember that, per capita, Chinese emissions remain relatively low.
*** The base year for Europe's measurements is 1990.
**** India is committed to an intensity energy target that goes beyond the business as usual 
path. Therefore, it can be considered as a very weak commitment or as non-commitment.
Source: OECD, The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation. Policies and Option for 
Global Action beyond 2012 (2009) and interviews.
Undoubtedly, these fi gures reveal a very strong aversion to climate change risk 
on the part of Europeans. The unilateral commitments they are willing to make are 
proportionally much higher than those of other countries or world regions. This is 
true if one compares Europe’s commitments with the risks that it would run pre-
suming an agreement is met. In other words, Europe appears to be strongly com-
mitted to fi ght climate change even in light of its modest vulnerability to climate 
change effects, compared to other world regions. However, if Europe’s Copenha-
gen commitments seem ambitious – more ambitious, it is true, than those of the 
United States – it is also because it is less expensive to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in Europe than in other world regions. In the United States, a 4% emis-
sions reduction for 2020 would cost just as much as a 20% reduction for Europe for 
2020. It is therefore only possible to compare emissions reduction commitments 
on the basis of the economic costs faced by each nation. If Europe proclaims to 
be governing by example on this subject, we must understand that it can afford to 
do so because its adaptation costs are the lowest. Therefore,  environmental risk 
aversion on the part of Europeans is especially strong, since their economic risk 
remains relatively low. The reasoning given here for the United States can also 
be applied to emerging countries. If countries like India have shown reluctance 
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to commit to emissions reductions despite their considerable economic risks, we 
might conclude that risk aversion is weaker on the part of Indians than on the part 
of Europeans. However, this interpretation would have to be qualifi ed by another 
interpretation: for Indians, it is the Western nations that should make signifi cant 
reductions efforts, since it is they who have, historically, been responsible for 
causing global warming.
3. Financial Risk
There are several ways to gauge fi nancial-based risk. One of them consists in com-
paring the structure of household fi nancial assets. Indeed, the more households 
that take risky assets, the weaker is their aversion to risk. The inverse is naturally 
true. Low-risk savings generally include bank investments and life insurance con-
tracts, whereas high-risk savings essentially deal with stock market shares. The 
fewer stock market shares held by a given actor, the higher that actor’s aversion to 
fi nancial risk. The contrast between the United States and Europe is indisputable 
in this sphere.
Stock Market Shares as a Percentage 
of Total Net Household Assets
France 3.4%
Germany 6.7%
United Kingdom 8.8%
Spain 10.7%
United States 17.9%
Source: Autorité des marchés fi nanciers, Lettre 
Economique et Financière Printemps (2009); 
DRAI, Département des études.
These fi gures are confi rmed by other indicators such as the net household sav-
ings ratio, which stands at 9.6% compared to 2.4% for the United States. These 
two ratios illustrate the vast contrast in precaution and risk aversion on either side 
of the Atlantic. Since the 2008 fi nancial crisis, the US’s net household savings 
ratio has increased to 4%, whereas for EU countries it has remained at 9.8%. The 
discrepancy between the EU and US rates remains considerable. The discrepancy 
is even more signifi cant than the fi gures suggest, because retirement and health 
plans are generally public in Europe, but private in the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Logically speaking, since risks of old age and health are social-
ized in Europe, Europeans should tend to save less than Americans. The case is, 
however, precisely the opposite. Given these facts, we comprehend that by and 
large, Europe claims stricter market fi nance regulation, even given the British 
exception.
4. Risk of War
There are several means of expressing aversion to the risk of war.
(1) An actor might increase its military efforts in order to deter potential adversar-
ies. Conversely, an actor might limit its defence efforts in the hope of encouraging 
other actors to do the same (‘disarmament race’). The second approach has clearly 
been the favourite of most Europeans. Currently, the European Member States 
allocate no more than 1.69% of its gross national product for military expenses, 
where the United States spends 4.5%.9 This last fi gure is in constant decline. It 
is less than the world average, which falls at 2.4% of the GDP.10 Throughout the 
2000 decade, Europe was the region with the lowest growth in military spending. 
Europe’s spending fell at 5%, compared with 87% for Russia, 66% for the Unites 
States, 56% for East Asia, 94% for North Africa, and 56% for the Middle East.11 
Europe shows no inclination towards using military force, and its structural powers 
provide it with no such predisposition. For even if Europe’s national armies pos-
sess abundant reserves, their operational capacities remain limited, especially for 
overseas operations. The European land forces are quantitatively larger than those 
of the United States, but the number of deployed European forces cannot exceed 
4%. In contrast, the maximum percentage of deployed forces for the United States 
is 14%. Despite certain political decisions intended to facilitate Europe’s overseas 
intervention capabilities, the EU continually has diffi culty conducting operations 
overseas. The EU pledged to create a joint rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops 
by the year 2003, but the project was hardly begun. The European armies, it is 
clear, are too poorly organized to deal with major shared risks, even if they proved 
capable in the recent fi ght against piracy in Somalia. The apparent effi cacy of 
the European effort in this case was most likely due to the fact that the project 
was viewed as a maritime police operation rather than a strictly military endeav-
our. These structural diffi culties point to three series of factors: fi rst, the European 
states are prepared to share their military sovereignty, but only sparingly. This is 
an especially troubling issue given the fact that Great Britain, militarily the stron-
gest European nation, is also the most hostile to the idea of a European military 
headquarters. The second series of factors is based largely on the decision, made 
by most European states, to outsource their security to North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO), and thus to the United States. The third series of factors comes 
from the way Europeans conceive of their purpose within the international system. 
Though the EU boasts about its twenty-two European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) missions, only six of them have been military operations:
9 European Defense Agency (EDA), ‘An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence 
Capability and Capacity Needs’, Endorsed by the Steering Board on 3 Oct. 2006.
10 Sipri, Recent Trends in Military Expenditures (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, January 2010).
11 Ibid.
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most European governments have proved highly risk averse, a criticism often 
leveled, with some justice, at the United States in the 1990s. The nature of EU 
decision making is likely to sustain this risk-averse behavior. In NATO, mili-
tary commitments are driven by the Alliance’s dominant member, the United 
States. In the United Nations, such decisions are taken by governments that, for 
the most part, do not intend to hazard their own soldiers in the resultant opera-
tions. As a result, NATO is prepared to accept risks at which the EU would balk, 
while the UN regularly takes chances which neither the EU nor NATO would 
countenance.12
(2) This aversion to the risk of war has a markedly strong social basis, which 
we can confi rm by examining numerous opinion studies on the European rela-
tion to war and to confl ict in general. It is especially useful to compare European 
perceptions regarding war with those of other political actors, notably the United 
States.
(a) On the moral justifi cation of war*. For the affi rmation ‘Under some 
conditions war is necessary to obtain justice’, the following responses were 
received:
EU-12* 25%
United States 71%
(b) On the importance of military compared to economic power*. For the ques-
tion ‘Is economic power more important than military power?’, the following 
responses were received:
EU-12* 78%
United States 61%
This general attitude towards war and confl ict proves all the more perceptible 
when one examines American and European public opinions concerning specifi c 
armed confl icts, notably those in Iran or Afghanistan.
(c) Attitudes in regard to Iran*. In support of the possibility to ‘Increase dip-
lomatic pressure on Iran but rule out the use of military force’, the following 
responses were received:
EU-12* 48%
United States 29%
12 J. Dobbins, ‘New Directions for Transatlantic Security Cooperation’, Survival 47, no. 4 (2005–
2006): 39–54.
In support of the potential to ‘maintain the option of using military forces’, the 
following responses were received:
EU-12 18%
United States 47%
Source: German Marshall Fund of the 
United States (GMF), Transatlantic Trends, 
Topline Data (Chicago, 2009), <www.gmfus.
org/trends/2009/docs/2009_English_Top.pdf>.
From this point of view of the study, we observe that European opinions regard-
ing the Iranian confl ict are much more withdrawn compared to the political posi-
tions taken by certain European Member States (France). It would be interesting to 
study how French opinion might evolve in the event of a confl ict with Iran (nuclear 
bombardments). It would be equally interesting to observe how the French politi-
cal position itself might evolve if faced with strong public opposition to war with 
Iran.
(d) On the confl ict in Afghanistan. Opinion studies taken on the subject of the 
Afghanistan confl ict have similar results; 77% of Europeans disapprove of sending 
European combat forces to Afghanistan; only 19% approve of such a manoeuvre. 
This condemnation is shared by almost all of the European Member States, includ-
ing new Member States such as Poland (80%) and Romania (84%).
(3) The third possibility for qualifying European risk aversion towards war 
involves an examination of current European discourse on the subject. For the pur-
poses of such an examination, there are several relevant documents that deal with 
the European relation to war. Here, we will cite just one.
The document in question is a rarely cited European Defense Agency (EDA) 
report. More so than most academic research, which unfortunately either insists on 
institutional choices or takes European discourse for granted,13 this report perfectly 
summarizes the European philosophy vis-à-vis use of force:
Indeed interventions will not necessarily involve fi ghting battles. The presence 
of multinational forces, (…) may well prevent hostilities from breaking out 
(…) or may help to stabilize a country or region after a political accord. The 
objective is not ‘victory’ as traditionally understood, but moderation, balance of 
 interests and peaceful resolution of confl icts – in short, stability.14
We are indeed at the heart of the European aversion to the risk of war. Military 
invention without war, without designating an enemy, and without aiming towards 
victory – these aspects entirely reject the Schmittian notion that  subordinates 
13 A. Menon, ‘Empowering Paradise? Europe at Ten’, International Affairs 85, no. 2 (2009): 
227–246.
14 European Defense Agency (EDA), n. 9 above.
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 politics to the existence of an enemy. Europe’s potential military operations are 
aimed not at fi ghting wars but rather at avoiding them. In the Petersberg missions, 
which defi ne the European doctrine regarding recourse to force, three levels of 
action are laid out: humanitarian missions or citizen evacuation; peacekeeping mis-
sions; and combat missions for managing crises, including peace reestablishment 
missions. It is clear that the majority of past European interventions fall under the 
fi rst two categories. No interventions to date have explicitly fallen under the third 
category, which would entail risks of exposition that would hold more signifi cant 
implications for the risk of war.
IV Why Are Europeans Risk Averse?
In a general sense, we can approach the question of risk in three ways: cultural 
explanations, institutional explanations, and contingent explanations. Cultural 
explanations must be considered together with the history and structure of a 
society’s social preferences. Institutional explanations are tied to the organiza-
tional modes of a society; contingent explanations rely on situational factors that 
have the potential to infl uence societal attitudes and behaviours in relation to risk. 
Obviously, these three approaches are often complementary. However, the weight 
of each varies according to the issue at hand. Aversion to the risk of war originates 
largely in post-World War II European history, whereas aversion to food safety 
risks is based on much more contingent factors. With time, contingent factors can 
take root and become structural factors. There is not, as far as we can tell, a global 
explanation for European risk aversion. However, there are several complemen-
tary factors that contribute to it: Europe’s non-state construction, the existence 
of deliberative European political spaces, Europe’s long-held social model aim-
ing towards market risk minimization, and, fi nally, the end of the need for an 
Empire.
The EU is not a state. Therefore, it cannot independently fulfi l the traditional 
security functions generally assigned to states. At the same time, European citizens 
cannot think themselves out of Europe, despite their political disaffection for it. On 
the one hand, they cannot address all of their demands to their respective states (as 
the Americans, Chinese, Indians, and Brazilians are tempted to do), nor can they 
redirect them towards Europe. European risk aversion results primarily from this 
ambivalence. This is all the more true given that Europe’s competitors are large 
nation states that aim to increase the traditional attributes of their sovereignty. At 
the end of the Cold War, the European model based on shared sovereignty seemed 
to prevail. However, today, the situation is quite different. The rise of Russia, 
China, India, and Brazil led to the return to a power politics structure with which 
Europe does not feel comfortable.
Even if European public space is far from having the coherence, force, or relative 
homogeneity of national public spaces, we cannot doubt its existence. The EU is the 
only world region with a powerful system for transnational democratic  representation 
(European Parliament). Ideas and representations circulate in Europe.15 Without a 
dense European space to take risk management out of the control of individual gov-
ernments, the growth of food safety, health, and environmental risk aversion over 
the past ten years would be unthinkable. We cannot emphasize enough the extent 
to which the Single Market also contributes to the creation of public space: free 
circulation of goods necessarily leads to free circulation of risks. The precaution-
ary principle, for example, comes from the convergence of a German-born Euro-
pean philosophy from the 1960s and the loss of citizen confi dence in risk regulation 
organs during the 1980s. This convergence explains why the principle evolved from 
an environmental principle to a broader crisis management and political governance 
principle.16 The same kind of reasoning can also be used when dealing with climate 
change. Europe’s vigorous Copenhagen commitments were strongly supported by 
public opinion – indeed, the EU’s strategy was to publicly post its positions before 
negotiations even began. However, if the EU boasts about ‘governance by exam-
ple’, other actors are barely impressed. China, for example, went so far as to refuse 
the inclusion of unilateral European commitments in the Copenhagen Declaration. 
Yet we would have diffi culty imagining the EU refusing to make commitments 
as long its negotiating partners had not made similar commitments. However, are 
Europeans public opinions ready to accept such a form of political bargaining? The 
question remains: is it really wise to show all of one’s cards before negotiating?
Beyond its apparent diversity, the EU’s social model has always tried to mini-
mize market risks by socializing them. One way to comprehend this is to measure 
the state’s redistributive power. Before taxes and social transfers, the poverty rate 
indicator is as high for the United States as for the EU: 13% of the population. 
After taxes and social transfers, the fi gure falls to 4% for the EU, but only to 10% 
for the United States (OECD). Another way to comprehend this risk socializa-
tion is to examine public social expenses for old age health and unemployment 
risks. These expenses account on average for 24.6% of the EU countries’ GDP, but 
only 15.9% of that of the United States. From this point of view, even the United 
Kingdom is closer to the EU average than the United States (21.3%). The EU-US 
difference here is not so much the fact that risk aversion is stronger in Europe than 
in the United States, but that the risk in Europe is strongly socialized, whereas in 
the United States it tends to be extremely privatized. Indeed, the US private social 
expenses stand at 10.1% of the GDP. The fi gure is at 2.5% for Germany, 3.2% for 
France, and even less for Scandinavian countries. Only the Netherlands (6.6%) 
and Great Britain (6.7%) break with this tendency.17 Even so, we can conclude 
15 Y. Tiberghien, ‘The Battle for the Global Governance of Genetically Modifi ed Organisms. The 
Roles of the European Union, Japan, Korea, and China in a Comparative Context’, Les Etudes du 
CERI 124 (2006): 49 pp.
16 F. Ewald, ‘Le principe de précaution oblige à exagérer la menace’, Le Monde, 10 Jan. 2010.
17 W. Adema & M. Ladaique, ‘How Expensive Is the Welfare State? Gross and Net Indicators 
in the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX)’, OECD Social, Employment and Migration 
Working Papers 92 (2009).
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that market risk aversion is a collective European concern. Though often judged 
obsolete and incompatible with rapid globalization, we fi nd that models favouring 
this risk aversion are more appealing than expected. Proof of this lies in the Obama 
administration’s recent efforts for providing the United States with stronger social 
security. Europe shows no particular genius in this sense: there is a universal aspi-
ration for linking economic and social progress. Of course, the EU may suffer from 
having high social standards, but this does not mean that its model is devalued. In 
fact, the 2008 fi nancial crisis modifi ed perceptions of the economic-social nexus.
Europeans have very clearly exhausted the need for an Empire. After having 
spent centuries fi ghting one another, they have concluded that the safest way to 
pacify their relations is to reject the use of force. Constructed from its foundations 
against war and the use of force, it is only appropriate that Europe should plead in 
opposition to these notions. For this reason precisely, the typical French aspiration 
for Europe as a global power (l’Europe puissance) is not shared by a good number 
of European nations. However, the aversion to the risk of war must be qualifi ed 
by the fact that certain European nation states have major military capabilities that 
give them protection, at least in part. In addition, when European nation states 
perceive a common risk, they turn to coercion and pressure methods that are gener-
ally effectual. The relative success of the Europeans in fi ghting Islamic terrorism 
(compared to the dismaying performance of the United States) bears witness to 
this fact.
V Conclusion
When speaking in terms of European political identity, risk aversion must be taken 
seriously. However, as always, we must be careful: there are two traps we should 
not fall into. The fi rst consists in an idealization of the European political identity, 
which places Europe at the avant-garde of a forthcoming, pacifi ed world. The sec-
ond, inversely, considers the European political identity at a distance. The interest 
in this identity is distracted, tinged with certain contempt. When the majority of 
Europeans refused to use the concept of a ‘war on terror’, it was probably because 
the mere term ‘war’ made them uneasy. At the same time, though, the term was 
absolutely inappropriate for facing a protean reality having nothing to do with the 
traditional forms of war. Indeed, European performance in the war against Islamic 
terrorism was by and large superior to that of the United States. Being risk averse 
is in itself therefore neither a quality nor a weakness. It is, rather, a manner of being 
in the world. Europe’s question is not to fi nd out whether or not it should repudi-
ate this identity, but to fi nd out how it might put it to use and how it might accord 
value to it in the context of the current international system. In order to do this, the 
EU must act in several ways.
The fi rst will require a harmonization of European positions at a time when 
Europe’s already multiple preferences are growing in various sectors. Europe’s 
underachievement at Copenhagen can be partly explained by lukewarm  mobilization 
in regard to the EU’s proposals. If, by some way or another, the Single Negotiator 
model was not extended to other strategic domains like climate change, Euro-
pean position might weaken. Herein lays the elemental limit of Europe’s norma-
tive power: it tends to stop precisely where it should begin. For the production of 
norms means nothing if they are not given value, especially in areas where force 
relations between major actors prove decisive. When considering Afghanistan, the 
vast majority of Europeans weigh the dead ends of a military solution. As such, 
they are incapable of developing a shared strategy, one that they could at least 
discuss with the United States while the latter nation is open to discussion. Here 
again, the question is not risk aversion in itself, but the possibility of shared strate-
gic action. What is at stake then is less risk aversion as such than the inhibition to 
make choices as if making choices is becoming in Europe a risk in itself.
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